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GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER CO.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
The Burden Is On Business
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.'
Congress expressly proscribed the use of all racially discrim-
inatory employment criteria in an attempt to afford equal opportunity
to all people when it adopted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
Nevertheless, seven years later, a far greater proportion of blacks remain
unemployed than whites.' While other factors help to maintain high
rates of unemployment among blacks, lingering racial discrimination
is clearly also at fault. The blanket prohibition of all forms of overt
discrimination merely forced the substitution of subtler devices that,
though neutral in appearance, achieved the same result. Employers,
in attempting to comply with the legislative mandate while maintaining
basically white work forces, instituted "objective" qualifications such
as scores on standardized tests and minimal educational levels. Their
assumption was that these criteria, by providing a quantitative measure-
ment of ability, would avoid the appearance of personal prejudice in-
herent in the more conventional techniques used by hiring personnel.
Blacks claimed, however, that such tests introduced their own elements
of racial bias.4 This bias stemmed from a long history of racial segre-
gation and separatism in the United States that prevented minority
groups from obtaining the same education, cultural stimulants, and
test-taking skills that have been available to others.5
The problem confronting Congress and the courts was how to
neutralize the employer's discretion racially without interfering with
his valid institutional interests. Congress attempted to reconcile these
1. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 2,
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703 et seq., 78 Stat. 255). § 2000e-2(c) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
3. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, MONTHLY
LABOR REvIEW 69 (Oct. 1970).
4. See Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in
Employment and Education, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 691 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Legal Implications]. The inadequacies of such tests have been examined by other
writers and will not be treated in any detail here. See E. GIISELLI, THE VALIDITY
OF OCCUPATIONAL APTITUDE TESTS (1961); M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL
DISCRIINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966); Cooper & Sobel, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Emplovment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969).
5. Any standard affected by these discriminatory patterns will have an adverse
impact on job opportunities for blacks. This is especially true of employment testing
in which the "crucial factors in a person's score are the quality and extent of his past
schooling and training and the degree of correlation between his cultural milieu and
that which serves as the test's point of reference." Cooper & Sobel, supra note 4, at
1639. Testing, then, rests on an "equal exposure" assumption which is,clearly fallacious
in comparing blacks and whites. Id.
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interests in the act by allowing employers to utilize "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification [s] '0 or "professionally developed ability test[s] '7
to screen prospective employees. Neither phrase explained whether a
company was to be limited to those qualifications and tests that
measured skills and abilities for a specific job, or whether more general
traits were measurable; nor did they place the burden of proving com-
pliance or non-compliance or indicate the nature and quantum of proof
required. The primary question raised was whether there could be a
genuine business purpose in setting requirements that were not ulti-
mately tied to the performance of a given job or set of jobs. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in its Guidelines for
Employee Selection Procedures,' suggested that there could not be such
a purpose, and that only a job-related criterion would permit the
use of qualifications or tests that could be shown to discriminate
racially.9 However, the EEOC has been endowed with interpretive
rather than legislative powers, so that its determinations achieve the
force of law only when judicially enforced." The profusion of litiga-
tion over the above statutory language, the sharp divergence of the
determinations produced, and the overall failure of the Act to end racial
discrimination in employment clearly evidenced the need for a conclusive
judicial evaluation of the scope of an employer's discretion.
The Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," was called
on to decide whether an employment policy which required an applicant
either to have completed high school or passed a standardized in-
telligence test violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when neither
standard was shown to be related to successful job performance, both
standards operated to exclude a disproportionate number of Negroes,
and the jobs in question had previously been filled only by whites. In
this case, several black employees of the Duke Power Company 2 in-
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). This section states:(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon
the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test,
its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin ...
8. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1971).
9. As expressed in the original Guidelines:
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed ability test" to
mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the
particular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords
the employer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particularjob or class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual or
organization claiming expertise in test preparation does not, without more,justify its use within the meaning of Title VII.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1971).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970). Although the EEOC was originally designed
to be the enforcement agent of Title VII, with the power to issue cease and desist
orders, H.R. REP. No. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1964), its powers are limited to
informal assistance such as conciliation or intervention on complainant's behalf to
effect a voluntary compliance from the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (1970). For
a detailed discussion of EEOC powers and procedures see Cohen & Fried, "Multiple
Jeopardy" in Employment Discrimination Cases, 31 MD. L. Rxv. 101 (1971).
11. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
12. Plaintiffs worked at the Company's Dan River Steam Station in North
Carolina. At the time of this action, the Company had ninety-five employees at this
station, fourteen of whom were blacks; thirteen of these were plaintiffs. Id. at 426.
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stituted a class action in which they sought to have the use of the
testing and educational standards enjoined. Duke Power, prior to the
Act, had followed a policy of overt discrimination by confining those
blacks hired to the labor department, in which the highest paying jobs
paid less than the lowest paying jobs in the four departments in which
only whites were employed.'" In 1955, management adopted a new
policy in which both hiring of personnel in all departments but labor
and interdepartmental transfers between other departments were con-
ditioned upon the employee's having the equivalent of a high school
education. In 1965, the company established an alternative policy
whereby those without high school educations could obtain inter-
departmental transfers by passing two general intelligence tests.'4
The plaintiffs put forth two main contentions. The first was that
the testing and high school requirements perpetuated the effects of
Duke Power's previous practice of overt discrimination. The reasoning
behind this allegation was that since white employees without a high
school education had been employed directly into the more desirable
jobs prior to the institution of educational restrictions, they could now
move freely into more lucrative jobs, while blacks, formerly hired into
only the labor department, were forced to meet the new requirements
to obtain any improvement in job position.'" Second, plaintiffs asserted
that the requirements were invalid under Title VII because they were
not based on any showing that they were job-related, as required by
the EEOC Guidelines.
The district court held that because the 1964 Civil Rights Act
did not offer any relief from past discriminatory acts, the results of
past discrimination would not be disturbed as long as present practices
were not discriminatory.' 6 The court of appeals, however, reversed the
district court on this point, holding that the six plaintiffs hired prior
to the adoption of the educational requirements should not be subject
to either the educational or testing requirements.' Both courts denied
13. Duke Power's work force was divided into five departments. There were
three "inside" departments, operations, maintenance, and testing, all having com-
parable wage rates. Of the two "outside" departments, labor was an unskilled
department into which blacks were hired, and coal handling, into which blacks had
not been allowed, was a step above labor having wage rates comparable to the inside
departments. Id. at 427.
In August, 1966. a Negro was first assigned to a department other than
labor. The employee, a high school graduate with thirteen years at Duke Power,
was promoted to coal handling five months after charges were filed with the EEOC.
Id. n.2.
14. Those tests, added at the request of the coal handling department, were the
Wonderlic Test and the Bennett Mechanical Test. Neither was directed or intended
to measure the ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs. Id.
at 428. For a discussion of these two tests, see Cooper & Sobel, supra note 4, at
1641-42.
15. Present white non-graduate applicants must meet the Company's new stand-
ards. Plaintiffs do not assert that these individuals are hired on a different basis than
are Negroes. Their argument, rather, is that black employees are "frozen" out of
better jobs. See note 24 infra.
16. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970). This decision
was in line with two recent cases: United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers,
282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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relief to those plaintiffs hired after the requirements were adopted on
the ground that they were given the same consideration as every new
white employee. Furthermore, both courts held that the requirements
did not have to be job-related, a decision in direct contradiction to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines.'8 Instead,
a showing of "genuine business purpose,"' 9 in the absence of intent
to discriminate,2" would justify the utilization of unrelated tests to
determine employment qualifications. The questions then, as presented
to the Supreme Court, were whether the educational and testing re-
quirements were in fact discriminatory; whether a court in considering
a charge of present discrimination must consider the company's past
pattern of giving preference to whites; and whether a showing of
general business convenience rather than a job-related need for the re-
quirements satisfied the standards imposed by Title VII on employers. 2'
The Court's response was written by Chief Justice Burger:
[T]he Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.
The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited.22
While the Chief Justice's language seems emphatic, it did not answer
all of the questions that could be raised by those determined to avoid
the broadest possible reading of Title VII. Nor did the decision
resolve the question of the consideration to be given other guidelines
promulgated by the EEOC.
I. PRESENT EFFECTS OF PAST DISCRIMINATION
One of the troublesome problems faced by the federal courts in
construing Title VII has been whether the Act was intended to have
prospective application only. The facts in Griggs indicated that those
incumbent black employees hired prior to the adoption of the educa-
18. The EEOC, in the Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, stated
that the term "professionally developed ability test" meant a test which "measures
the knowledge or skills required by the particular job." Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1971).
. 19. 420 F.2d at 1235 n.8. Duke Power's business purpose is the desire to train
its own employees for supervisory positions, and to upgrade the intelligence level
of its employees so that progression upward through the Company could be accom-
plished. Id. at 1231.
20. Lack of intent was predicated upon three facts: (1) The educational re-
quirements had been instituted nine years prior to the passage of the Civil Rights
Act; (2) whites as well as blacks were adversely affected; and (3) Duke paid the
major portion of employee expenses for those desiring education. Id. at 1232-33.
21. In his court of appeals dissent, Judge Sobeloff, responding to the plaintiffs'
allegation that centuries of discrimination have placed blacks at a disadvantage in
competing with whites for jobs requiring testing or educational minimums causing
a denial of jobs they have the ability to perform, included a challenge to the Supreme
Court stating that "[o]n this issue hangs the vitality of the employment provisions(Title VII) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: whether the Act shall remain a potent
tool for equalization of employment opportunity or shall be reduced to mellifluous
but hollow rhetoric." Id. at 1237-38.
22. 401 U.S. at 431.
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tional and testing standards had been locked into the labor department
by the new policies. The Company did not deny that fact but based
its defense upon the proposition that the present consequences of past
discrimination were outside the coverage of the Act. The Court in
Griggs firmly resolved the invalidity of that contention, stating:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII ....
was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, prac-
tices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral
in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze"
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.28
By holding that employment practices which perpetuate the effects of
past discrimination fall within the Title VII prohibition, the Supreme
Court adopted the rationale of several lower courts which had con-
demned the "freezing" effect produced by prior discriminatory poli-
cies.24 While the decision by no means rules out an employer's right
to justify suspect standards in terms of his business needs, it makes it
clear that by building a neutral superstructure upon discriminatory
racial patterns erected in the past he may fall within the Title VII ban.
II. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Intent: Plaintiff's Burden
In section 706 (g) of Title VII,25 Congress provided that to be
entitled to relief, a complainant must show that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice. But this language does not clearly establish
whether a showing of discriminatory purpose is necessary, or whether
it is enough to prove that the respondent meant to use a particular
practice and that the practice resulted in discrimination.26 Consequently,
23. 401 U.S. at 429-30.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers, 282 F. Supp. 39(E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). In these cases, job seniority systems which had
the effect of perpetuating past discrimination were struck down. Judge Butzner held
in Quarles, "that Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro
employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act." 279 F. Supp. at
516. See also Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost I. & A. Workers v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (union membership).
The Court, in United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964), in
explaining the concept of freezing stated:
[t]he term "freezing" is used in two senses. It may be said that when illegal
discrimination or other practices have worked inequality on a class of citizens
and the court puts an end to such a practice but a new and more onerous standard
is adopted before the disadvantaged class may enjoy their rights, already fully
enjoyed by the rest of the citizens this amounts to "freezing" the privileged
status for those who acquired it during the period of discrimination, and "freezing
out" the group discriminated against.
Id. at 768.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
26. The latter view was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Local 189, UnitedPapermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1969), where the
defendants persisted in their conduct after its racial consequences had become evident.
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the courts and commentators were divided on whether a subjective
test of an employer's intent or an objective standard of awareness of
effective discrimination was needed. 7 In Griggs, the court of appeals
concluded that intent to discriminate was a necessary element of a
cause of action under section 703(h) of the Act.2" Finding that at
the time it adopted its diploma and test requirements Duke Power did
not have the requisite intent to discriminate, and that it did not use
those criteria with the conscious purpose to discriminate against blacks,
the court dismissed the claim.29
In overruling the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court explained
that although the lower court did not err in determining that Duke
Power did not intentionally discriminate, "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job capability.""0 The Court further
indicated that the specific language in section 703 (h) permitting certain
tests that are not "designed, intended, or used to discriminate"'" offered
an alternative objective basis by which to find a violation, because
"Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation. '32 By applying this
objective requirement to the area of employment discrimination, the
Court was treating employment discrimination the same as other racial
problem areas to which an objective standard had already been applied. 3
Several advantages can be gained by this effect-oriented approach.
When the evidence demonstrates that the employment practices ad-
versely affect a minority group, a finding of discrimination is supported
without reference to the employer's intentions. On the other hand,
requiring a complainant to prove what was on the mind of an employer
at the time he instituted a new practice would usually be an insuperable
burden.34 For one thing, he must rely heavily on such external in-
27. See Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465, 503 (1968) ; Bonfield, The Substance of American
Fair Employment Practices Legislation I: Employers, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 906, 956(1967).
28. 420 F.2d at 1232.
29. Id.
30. 401 U.S. at 432.
31. Id. at 433.
32. Id. at 432.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) and United States
v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964) (voting); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) and Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp.
60 (W.D. La. 1968) (conduct of public officials) ; Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967) (education). See also Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal Courts -
Private or Public Law, 15 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1969).
34. See Affeldt, supra note 33, at 4-5. That author feels that[i]f the courts ... adopt the hostile motive test approach by insisting that
the charging party must prove that the employer or union had the specific intent
to discriminate against him because of race, etc., there is little hope that Title VII
will add any dimension of freedom to our society. Such a private law definition
of discrimination resting upon the fault or culpability of the respondent would
make the Act virtually unenforceable. . . . Title VII is not a criminal statute
designed to penalize respondents for entertaining bad thoughts about minority
groups, but a regulatory statute aimed at controlling anti-social conduct.
[VOL. XXXI
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dicators as statistics, which may not be sufficient to prove intent to
discriminate.3 5 He would also be faced with the task of rebutting all
of the employer's possible justifications. Furthermore, since the em-
ployer frequently has no discriminatory intent in using seemingly
objective requirements, a subjective approach would be ineffective
regardless of the onerousness of the results of his practices. Indeed,
by following the narrow approach of the Fourth Circuit in Griggs,
the broad scope and purposes of Title VII 6 as evidenced in section
703(a) would be negated.
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court's decision in
Griggs did not put to rest all the questions that have arisen with
regard to the element of intent that a plaintiff must prove. It appears,
in spite of the broad language used in many sections of the opinion,
that the complainant must demonstrate that the employment standard
in question does have a differential impact based on race; absent this
effect, the employer's standard does not violate the ActY But the
Court did not indicate exactly how substantial that impact must be. 8
For example, one district court, in a case preceding Griggs, held that
the fact that five to ten percent more blacks might fail a test was nojustification for imposing different standards.39  Another found that a
difference of fifty-five percent in the passing rates of the two races
would make the test illegal.4" The percentages in Griggs fall between
those two cases. 41 Whether the Supreme Court in Griggs was saying
35. See Kovarsky, Testing and the Civil Rights Act, 15 How. L.J. 227, 240
(1969).
36. Congressional intent is manifest in the following statement by the House
Judiciary Committee in H.R. REP. No. 914:
In various regions of the country there is discrimination against some minority
groups. Most glaring, however, is the discrimination against Negroes which
exists throughout our Nation. Today, more than 100 years after their formal
emancipation, Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our population, areby virtue of one or another type of discrimination not accorded the rights,
privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and must be, the
birthright of all citizens.
Considerable progress has been made in eliminating discrimination in many
areas because of local initiative either in the form of State laws and local
ordinances or as the result of voluntary action. Nevertheless, in the last decade
it has become increasingly clear that progress has been too slow and that national
legislation is required to meet a national need which becomes evermore obvious.
It is, however, possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legislation
which prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most serious types
of discrimination. This H.R. 7152, as amended, would achieve . . . . It would
prohibit discrimination in employment ....
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2393-94 (1964).
37. The Court initially stated that "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed." 401
U.S. at 431 (emphasis added). The Court later went on to state that "Congress
has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must
have a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. at 432. It appears
that the Court would be unable to proscribe any standard which has not been
shown to have a discriminatory effect.
38. The EEOC Guidelines are hinted at as one possible source for an answer.
Id. at 433-34.
39. United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 77-78 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
40. Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass.
1969).
41. The EEOC found in one case that use of a battery of tests, including the
Wonderlic and Bennett Tests used by Duke Power Company in the instant case,
19711
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that both tests would be illegal as a matter of law, or whether it was
merely stating that future cases will be decided on the percentages is
unclear.4 2 The fact that the Court did not refer to any need to show
substantiality of the disparate effect might be an indication that any
showing of a differential effect by race will invalidate the criterion.
B. Job-Relatedness: Defendant's Burden
Disagreement over the right of an employer to give tests which
might discriminate racially because of the unequal backgrounds of
applicants arose prior to the adoption of Title VII. A hearing examiner
for the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Committee held, in Myart
v. Motorola,4 3 that all tests which had discriminatory effects were
unlawful, even if the tests provided accurate measurements of the char-
acteristics an employer wished to find in his employees. Congress
examined the Illinois case and introduced section 703(h) to protect
the employer's right to administer suitable employment tests; but the
legislative history of the drafting of the section does not indicate whether
the lawmakers intended to authorize all tests that were reliable indicators
of whatever they sought to measure, or only those tests that measured
ability to do a particular job. This ambiguity is evident both in the
contradictory statements of Senator Tower who introduced the
section,44 and in the contradictory readings of the legislative history
by the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court.45
As a result, two distinct interpretations of the phrase "professionally
developed ability test" emerged. The first, adopted by the district court
and the Fourth Circuit in Griggs, would permit an employer to use any
general intelligence test that has been prepared by a qualified tester.
As the district court explained:
The two tests used by the defendant were never intended to
accurately measure the ability of an employee to perform the
particular job available. Rather, they are intended to indicate
whether the employee has the general intelligence and overall
resulted in fifty-eight percent of whites passing the tests, as compared with only
six percent of blacks. With regard to the education requirement, 1960 census statistics
for North Carolina show that, while thirty-four percent of white males had completed
high school, only twelve percent of Negro males had done so. 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6
(1971).
42. Even experts on testing have not reached any agreement on the minimal
percentage of racial differential that is permissible. See, e.g., Cooper & Sobel,
supra note 4, at 1640-41, 1644, 1664-65; Legal Implications, supra note 4, at 701-03.
43. The findings of the Myart hearing are presented in full in 110 CoNG. REc.
5662-64 (1964). In Myart, a black job applicant contended that his rejection was
due to the discriminatory effect of an intelligence test he was required to take.
44. He first stated that § 703(h) was to protect an employer's right to "give
general ability and intelligence tests to determine the trainability of prospective
employees." 110 CONG. REc. 13492 (1964). In elaborating, he explained that the
new section would protect the employer's right to determine the "professional com-
petence or ability or trainability or suitability of a person to do a job." Id. (emphasis
added).
45. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-35 nn.10 & 11 (1971),
with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1970), criticized in
5 RICHMOND L. REV. 157 (1970). For a detailed discussion of this legislative history
see Affeldt, supra note 33, at 20-21; Cooper & Sobel, supra note 4, at 1649-55; Legal
Implications, supra note 4, at 706-10.
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mechanical comprehension of the average high school graduate,
regardless of race . . . .The evidence establishes that the tests
were professionally developed to perform this function and there-
fore are in compliance with the Act.4
The EEOC rejected this interpretation and demanded that the test
bear some relationship to the skills or abilities needed for the job in
question. 7 The debate encompassed differing theories as to which
party had the burden of proving compliance or non-compliance with
the Act.
These questions were silenced by the Supreme Court's determina-
tion that "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing
that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question."4 What this means, concluded the Chief
Justice, "is that any tests used must measure the person for the job
and not the person in the abstract."49 After Griggs, then, once the
complainant has established the existence of discrimination under Title
VII, the burden shifts and the employer must show that his standards
are so appropriately related to the specific employment activity that
they will enhance the successful operation of the business. In so holding,
the Court adopted the burden of proof already applicable in cases
involving discrimination in education" and voting.5
III. SOME REMAINING QUESTIONS
The tasks lying ahead for the courts involve differentiating be-
tween those employment prerequisites that give a "reasonable measure
of job performance"52 and those that are inadequate measures or were
implemented for purposes falling short of actual business necessity.
The judiciary will also have to determine what constitutes a successful
46. 292 F. Supp. at 250. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225,1234 (4th Cir. 1970); Whitfield v. United Steelworkers, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.
1959).
47. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1971). See also United States v. H.K. PorterCo., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968); United States v. Local 189, UnitedPapermakers, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) ;Dobbins v. Local 212, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio
1968).
48. 401 U.S. at 432.
49. Id. at 436.
50. In education, a system of testing was ordered to be discontinued in Hobson
v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), where the tests given were not relevant
measures of the children's abilities and the results generally led to blacks being
placed in lower "tracks" which in turn gave them preparation only for lower
positions in life.
51. The downfall of the literacy test had been speeded up by a decision inGaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1965), that to sustain such tests,
the court must find a valid relation between the test and the results desired by usingit. In Gaston County, the Supreme Court found that unequal educational opportunitiesfor Negroes in North Carolina would alone be sufficient to cause suspension under
the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74 (1970). In passing that Act,Congress had concluded that the relationship of testing to state interest in determining
voter qualifications was at best tenuous; likewise, the Court has found that historicallyliteracy tests do not accurately predict who would be the better voter. See also
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
52. 401 U.S. at 436.
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defense to a complaint. It is already clear that future cases, in
light of Griggs, will be replete with studies, statistics, and expert
opinions on both sides in an effort to prove or disprove the ability
of a company's devices to predict job performance accurately."5 The
decision in Griggs is of little help in defining its own limits since the
facts there did not show that either the high school completion re-
quirement or the general intelligence test bore any demonstrable re-
lationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used,
and did show that both were adopted without meaningful study of
such a relationship.
54
A. The Quantum of Proof of Job-Relatedness
In United States v. Georgia Power Company,55 decided after
Griggs, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, con-
fronted with a similar fact situation but with detailed and extensive
efforts to attack and defend the validity of the requirements in dispute,
held that the testing procedures were lawful and the high school
education requirement unlawful.56 The tests were found to satisfy the
interpretation of section 703(h) in Griggs in that they were adopted
after a meaningful study of their relationship to job performance which
disclosed that they were correlated with the important elements of
relevant work behavior and fairly measured the knowledge or skills
required by the particular job or class of jobs. Other cases decided
since Griggs have found insufficient validation of the tests used.57
While it is clear that evidence of professional validation of employ-
ment tests is necessary in an attempt to comply with the EEOC's
53. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 3 BNA FEP CAs. 767 (N.D.
Ga. 1971).
Psychological testing experts seek "correlation coefficients" as evidence of
a test's validity. A correlation coefficient is a "statistical summary of the relation
between two variables," here performance on the test and subsequent performance
on the job. A correlation of 1.00 shows a perfect relationship (i.e., exact predict-
ability) ; it is unusual for a validity coefficient to rise above 0.60. For the method
of computing the coefficient, see L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTING 128-35 (1970). Cronbach has found that coefficients as low as 0.30 are of
"definite practical value," making a considerable contribution to a business' efficiency
though forecasting incorrectly for many individuals. However, whether a validity
coefficient is high enough to warrant prediction from the test depends on many
variables inherent in each situation. For a further discussion, see CRONBAcH at
135-42, 290-91, 429-31.
54. 401 U.S. at 431.
55. 3 BNA FEP CAS. 767 (N.D. Ga. 1971). In the early 1960's Georgia Power
Company imposed requirements of a high school education and a predetermined score
on certain aptitude tests upon all new employees and upon all incumbent employees
assigned to the job classifications of laborer, janitor, porter, and maid seeking to
transfer to jobs in a new line of progression. Id. at 773.
56. Concerning the degree, the court in Georgia Power noted that countless
employees without diplomas mastered high school-type skills through self-study,
adult education courses, and perseverance, and advanced to the highest technical
levels in the company. Id. at 787.
57. See Colbert v. H-K Corp., 3 BNA FEP CAS. 602 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Armstead
v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971);
Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 3 BNA FEP CAS. 719 (N.D.
Miss. 1971); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 3 BNA FEP CAs. 672 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
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minimum standards,5" the type or quantum of evidence needed is far
from settled. 9 The most accurate way to learn whether a person can
do a job is to let him attempt it for a number of years and then assess
his performance, but this can be a costly procedure to both the company
and the unsuccessful individual.60 This test has not been required by
any court. A three-fold test of validity was adopted in Chance v.
Board of Examiners,"' where the court sought proof of content validity,
predictive validity, and objective administration of the tests.6 2 The
EEOC Guidelines require discussion of differential validity; that is,
separate validity statistics for minority and non-minority groups. The
question of how much and what type of validation of a test is required
is not likely to be resolved until the Supreme Court speaks again. 63
B. The Limited Role of General Intelligence
A defense unsuccessfully asserted by Duke Power and by Georgia
Power in the later case was the company's goal of upgrading the overall
quality of its work force. On this ground, both companies sought to
justify their requirements as indicative of general intelligence and
trainability, even where such requirements were not actually necessary
for the job being filled. The Supreme Court's response was that, in
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4-.5 (1971). "Evidence of a test's validity should consist
of empirical data demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly cor-
related with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant
to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated." Id. § 1607.4(c).
59. Studies have shown that some tests have a negative value in predicting job
success, and even the commonly used Wonderlic Intelligence Test was found to have
no relation to job performance. See E. GISELLI, supra note 4, at 46; Cooper &
Sobel, supra note 4, at 1644; Legal Implications, supra note 4, at 696-706. The first
definite analysis of how job testing might be accomplished after Griggs, a book
entitled THE LAW AND PERSONNEL TESTING, will soon be published by the American
Management Association. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1971, § F, at 5, col. 2.
60. E. GHISELLI, supra note 4, at 7. Some other proposed improvements over
the tests currently being employed are described by Stanley Klein in Job Testing
Comes Under Fire, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1971, § F, at 5, col. 1. Examples are
"work-sampling," performance tests, orally administered tests and "cultural-laden"
tests, which test reactions to life experiences rather than schooling. Id. at cols. 4, 5.
61. 3 BNA FEP CAS. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
62. Content validity insures that as to subject matter the examination will elicit
from the candidate information that is relevant to the job for which he is applying.
The validity of an examination as a means of selecting candidates best suited for a
position may also be verified empirically by comparing the examination scores of
successful candidates with their later performance on the job. If there is a significant
correlation between test scores and later performance, the examination has predictive
validity. Id. at 682-83. For a detailed explanation of validation see L. CRONBACH,
supra note 53, at 123, 125-28, 429-34.
63. Such delays are not uncommon in the final interpretation of Supreme Court
decisions. In the recent decision of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court, seventeen years after its landmark decision in
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), recognized the need to define
Brown in more functional terms to aid lower courts in applying it:
district courts and courts of appeals have struggled in hundreds of cases with a
multitude and variety of problems under this Court's general directive. Under-
standably, in an area of evolving remedies, those courts had to improvise and
experiment without detailed or specific guidelines. This Court, in Brown I,
appropriately dealt with the large constitutional principles; other federal courts
had to grapple with the flinty, intractable realities of day-to-day implementation
of those constitutional commands. Their efforts, of necessity, embraced a process
of "trial and error" ....
402 U.S. at 6.
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the absence of evidence that the high school diploma and test score
requirements were needed to maintain the company's standards in
higher level jobs than those sought by the plaintiffs, such standards
were not business necessities.6 4
The absence of a business necessity for general intelligence tests
and educational requirements is shown more easily in the essentially
manual jobs involved in Griggs and Georgia Power than in jobs
demanding certain mental attainments as well. At the opposite end
of the employment spectrum - doctors, lawyers, engineers, for
example - common sense dictates that a high degree of knowledge is
necessary for the job.65 More difficult decisions will arise with the
large middle ground of office, sales, and technical jobs, for which
general intelligence tests can measure a person's ability to think
abstractly, facility with the English language, ability to perform mathe-
matical calculations, willingness to assume responsibility, and acuity
of insight. Whereas a typing test would clearly be related to the job
of a typist, an employer might contend that intelligence above a certain
level is equally important. There is presently no guide for a court
attempting to decide what is a reasonable relationship between an
arbitrary cutoff point on an intelligence test and performance of such
a job.66 Moreover, it may also be reasonable for an employer to
presume that clerical jobs will generally be performed best by those
who have been exposed to certain experiences through high school
or college education.
The sweep of Griggs is likely to affect tests other than those of
''general intelligence." An example is seen in the standards for hiring
teachers, where the essential qualities are not necessarily susceptible to
written testing. One federal case has already rejected the use of certain
test scores in hiring elementary and secondary school teachers, finding
that a low ranking on the test does not mean that a teacher lacks the
knowledge or skill requisite for effective classroom performance. 67
64. 401 U.S. at 432.
65. The more specific requirements for such professional jobs have also come
under fire recently. See, e.g., Adkins, What Doth the Board Require of Thee?
28 MD. L. REv. 103, 117 (1968), in which the author, then a member of the Maryland
State Board of Bar Examiners, discusses the deficiencies of bar examinations in
determining bar admissions. However, because bar examiners won't list the names
of those who fail the bar examination, it is "virtually impossible to check the
accuracy of charges that minority group applicants are having trouble" with the
tests in various states or to ascertain whether any difficulties minority applicants
may be having are related to factors cited in Griggs. Stevens, Bar Examinations
and Minority Group Applications, 56 A.B.A.J. 969, 970 (1970).
66. See Colbert v. H-K Corp., 3 BNA FEP CAs. 602 (5th Cir. 1971).
The use of tests in this difficult middle ground of vocations has caused a
controversy between the EEOC and the Civil Rights Division of the United States
Department of Justice on the one hand, and the federal Civil Service Commission
on the other. The rights agencies assert that the Federal Service Entrance Exam-
ination, required of all applicants for federal jobs paying $6,928 to $10,470 a year,
could not be used by a private employer under Title VII. A study by the Urban
Institute introduced in a federal district court suit seeking to enjoin the use of the tests,
concludes that the test rejects a disproportionate number of blacks. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 26, 1971, § 1, at 67, cols. 2-5.
67. Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 325 F. Supp. 560
(N.D. Miss. 1971), in which the school district had established a policy under which
teachers and applicants for teaching positions had either .to meet certain cutoff points
on the Graduate Record Examination or to possess a master's degree, the effect of
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Another case has questioned whether there are examinations which
validly predict the ability of candidates for supervisory positions since
success in such jobs depends not only on one's specific knowledge of
his field, but also on such intangible factors as leadership skill, sensi-
tivity to others, and ability to organize, to articulate, to induce sub-
ordinates to follow directions, to initiate new programs, and to analyze
administrative problems .
6
Another important motive for a company's utilization of higher
standards than are needed for the jobs being filled is to determine
the promotability of the applicants. Although the Supreme Court in
Griggs did not answer directly the question of whether an employer
may take into account capability for future promotions, the same
standard of business necessity can be said to apply ;69 that is, promot-
ability must be an essential trait in candidates for a certain job.
According to the EEOC Guidelines, promotability may be considered
only when the applicant's advancement to the next job is "nearly
automatic" and not too far in the future.70 While this principle is also
more easily applied in the case of the low level employees in Griggs71
than to applicants for office jobs, courts will have to distinguish between
those situations in which eventual managerial or other abilities are
merely business conveniences and those in which they are indispensable
traits from the outset. One obvious reason for such a distinction is
that the very qualities usually needed for promotions are often those
learned and developed while on the job.72 The burden of presenting
the determinative facts in each case will again be on the employer,
who must include such information within his analysis of the jobs
in question.
C. Criteria Other Than Tests
Another question is the extent to which the Griggs requirement
that a test provide a "reasonable measure of job performance" can be
applied to criteria other than testing. On this point the Supreme Court
stated clearly that any requirement must have a manifest relationship
to the employment in question.7' Traditionally, courts have been re-
which was to reduce the percentage of black teachers in the school system. The
court found that the GRE was neither designed nor validated for use in the
selection of elementary or secondary school teachers.
68. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 3 BNA FEP CAS. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
In this case, the evidence revealed that the examinations prepared and administered
by the Board for the licensing of supervisory personnel, such as principals and
assistant principals, discriminated substantially against black and Puerto Rican
applicants. The court ruled that the Board failed to meet its burden of proving
that the examinations were necessary to select supervisors possessing the skills and
qualifications needed for the successful performance of their duties. The court noted
that although the Board had sought to secure valid tests, and in fact its tests had
been improved, it had not yet achieved truly job-related examination procedures.
69. Other writers have decided that because there was no direct answer to
this question in Griggs, it is still an open question. See Policy Guide, CCH FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PtCTS. MANUAL 452 (1971).
70. See Affeldt, supra note 33, at 21-23.
71. See Cooper & Sobel, supra note 4, at 1648: "It is unnecessary and, indeed,
wasteful to require the potential for promotion to the top in each low level employee."
72. See note 56 supra.
73. 401 U.S. at 432.
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luctant to interfere with minimum educational requirements, since
public policy is to encourage students to remain in school.74 Awareness
of the increasing disparity between the percentages of white and non-
white graduates at every level and the effect of this on equal employ-
ment opportunity led the Supreme Court to the conclusion that such
obstacles to employment could no longer be used without thought of
their value as predictors of job performance. 75 Requirements of work
experience, usually job-related on their face, have also generally been
held to be legitimate selection devices. 76 But both the education and
work experience requirements must be rejected where they merely
perpetuate the effect of a company's or a society's past discrimination
by locking minorities into the lower jobs.77 Another criterion that has
been accepted in the past is that an employer may refuse to hire
frequently arrested persons. This practice was forbidden in Gregory
v. Litton Systems, Inc.,78 because a greater proportion of blacks are
arrested than whites, frequently as the result of discrimination.
79
While all three of these standards represent typical tools of business
convenience, Griggs seems to require from an employer the best feasible
showing that such standards are born of business needs and will reason-
ably predict job performance. An employer's preference will apparently
have no legal weight if it can be shown that he prefers non-essential
characteristics that appear more frequently in whites than in blacks.
The type of proof will vary with the kinds of jobs at issue, but the
burden of coming forth with extensive and complex evidence will clearly
be on the employer. He must provide a detailed functional analysis
of the background and abilities essential to the specific job or jobs in
question before demonstrating the ability of his testing or other pro-
cedures to measure those abilities."' At the same time, the complainant
will be allowed to suggest equally workable alternatives which would
reduce the discriminatory effect on employment of blacks.
74. Many courts assumed a requirement of high school graduation was valid.
See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970);
Dobbins v. Local 212, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio
1968).
75. For details of this disparity, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1968 (89th ed. 1968).
76. See 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1145-50.
77. See Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost I. & A. Workers v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416
F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
78. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
79. A majority of male ghetto residents, ninety percent in some areas, have
arrest records of some sort. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
75 (1967).
In a similar vein, another federal court in California has ruled illegal under
Title VII and Griggs a company rule authorizing discretionary dismissal of an
employee suffering more than one wage garnishment. The court cited authorities
indicating that garnishments affect minority group members more often than others,
and rejected as not constituting business necessity the company's complaint of time
and expense involved in responding to employees' creditors. Johnson v. Pike Corp.
of America, 40 U.S.L.W. 2207 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1971). It is noteworthy that
the Johnson case concerned dismissal of a present employee rather than screening
of a prospective one.
80. Dr. Cronbach explains that a job analysis should establish the characteristics
that determine job success or failure. L. CRONBACH, supra note 53, at 407-10.
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IV. THE SOUNDER APPROACH: ADMINISTRATIVE
OR JUDICIAL?
The final problem involved in determining "reasonable measures
of job performance," which could very well become the center of the
controversy, is whether the EEOC Guidelines are now to be adopted
in their entirety by the courts. At one point in Griggs, the Supreme
Court seemed to indicate that they are, stating: "Since the Act and
its legislative history support the Commission's construction, this
affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of
Congress. '8'  Further on, the Court narrowed this implication to in-
clude only the specific Guidelines under discussion when, in over-
ruling the Fourth Circuit's decision that the Guidelines are not binding
on the courts,82 it held that since the EEOC's specific requirement ofjob-relatedness comported with congressional intent, that Guideline
was binding.83 Referring to federal agency or commission determina-
tions in general, the Court reconfirmed several earlier cases in which
it had held such rulings to be entitled to great deference. 4 Although
this would not necessarily negate a specific finding that all of the
EEOC Guidelines are binding, it shows an intention that the courts
not be bound blindly by those rulings in all cases.
The advantage to be gained by adhering to the Guidelines lies in
the expertise that has been developed by the EEOC, especially in tech-
nical matters. The danger, however, lies in their inflexibility. Under
the Guidelines, tests with a detrimental effect on minority groups are
presumptively illegal unless: "(a) the test has been validated and
evidences a high degree of utility . . . and (b) the person giving or
acting upon the results of the particular test can demonstrate that
alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are unavail-
able for his use."8 5 The Guidelines then set out the minimum evi-
dentiary requirements to establish proper validation. 6 In addition,
they call for proof of validity specific to each unit of a multi-unit
organization wherever differences exist between units,8 7 of controlled
and standardized testing conditions,8 8 of an absence of bias in the use
of supervisors' ratings, 9 and of separate validation for the different
racial groups involved." As already mentioned, "automatic" promotion
is the only justification for testing at a higher level than that at which
the applicant seeks entry into the company.91
81. 401 U.S. at 434.
82. See International Chem. Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp.
365, 366 (N.D. Miss. 1966), which stated that while not conclusive on the courts,
executive agency interpretations are entitled to the highest respect. See also Grimm
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969) ; American Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C. 1968).
83. 401 U.S. at 436.
84. 401 U.S. at 434, citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Power Reactor
Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1971).
86. Id. at § 1607.4-.5. See note 58 supra.
87. Id. at § 160 7 .4(c) (2).
88. Id. at § 1607.5(b) (2).
89. Id. at § 1607.5(b) (4).
90. Id. at § 1607.5(b) (5).
91. Id. at § 1607.4(c) (1). See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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One fear is that strict application of the EEOC Guidelines could
force employers to create new techniques that would not trigger the
operation of Title VII. " Numerical quotas and first come, first served
employment could be used to preclude a plaintiff from proving dis-
crimination.93 Such practices would require an employer to ignore his
own business needs, which is precisely what Congress sought to avoid
in passing section 703(h).
If the only goal of efforts to reform job entry standards is to
right an existing pattern of racial injustice, the EEOC Guidelines would
be an effective tool for the courts to apply. The actual goal, however,
is to provide reasonable as well as nondiscriminatory bases for hiring
and promotion of all personnel. Precise and detailed proof of valida-
tion will not always be available and may impose an unfair burden on
employers. In any case it is not easy for the respondent to show the
absence of any alternative policies. Stringent provisions against using
promotability as a hiring criterion could discriminate against better
qualified applicants. Furthermore, depending on the test applied,94
requiring a differential validation by races could make reliance on the
Guidelines damaging to culturally deprived white workers who would
be judged by the higher standards applied to better-trained members
of their race.
In Georgia Power Co.,95 an employer's testing practices were
found to be validated adequately in light of Griggs even though they
failed to satisfy the Guidelines of the EEOC. As explained in that case
the rather startling evidence offered by the government was to
the effect that there was no test known to exist or yet devised
which could meet [the EEOC] standards. The court concludes
that Section 703(h) was not intended by the Congress nor in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court in such meaningless fashion.
Psychological testing is itself a new inexact science. Reputable
able people . . . readily disagree over the ultimate validity of almost
any test when related to a particular job or employer. In Griggs,
validity is a reasonable, not absolute, requirement. It is in-
escapable that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
regulations, while on the whole helpful, are not binding in this
respect.96
92. Many companies have dropped aptitude testing altogether, especially where
validation would be difficult to prove. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,,1971, § F, at 5, col. 1.
93. See Blumrosen, supra note 27. Professor Blumrosen's assumption is that
once a substantial number of blacks gain employment, the recruiting system will
become self-operating due to the word-of-mouth referral mechanism. But there are
discriminatory aspects of a quota system also - e.g., where a job opening is available
and the company has "enough" blacks already employed.
Another recent strategem of the courts has been to take into account any
new practices or policy changes instituted by the company subsequent to the filing
of a complaint. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.
1970).
94. The Guidelines require compilation of separate statistics on test performance
for different racial groups. "A test which is dfferentially valid may be used in
groups for which it is valid but not for those in which it is not valid." Tests
which produce higher scores for one group than another must be scored using
separate passing scores for each group. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5) (1971).
95. 3 BNA FEP CAS. 767 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
96. Id. at 787 n.8.
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As recognized in Georgia Power, perfect employment tests have
not yet been developed. Perhaps, if future studies produce tests which
are more meaningful to both black and white employees, proving
validation will become a simple matter. For now, the complexity of
this burden has forced even the EEOC at times to settle for less than
convincing arguments. 7
A more flexible alternative to the present administrative approach
would vary the employer's burden according to the substantiality of
the racial impact of the company's standards; in other words, the
greater the discrimination, the closer the nexus required between the
standards employed and the job in question. Such other factors as the
size of the company and the feasibility of a thorough validation study
would also be essential. Courts should demand a more sophisticated
and exhaustive analysis where either a large company or a sizable
detriment to blacks is involved. A lesser showing would suffice for
smaller companies or less substantial injustices. s The same factors
would help determine the extent to which an employer must prove
that promotability, trainability or background are traits demanded by
his business needs. Companies would have the option of spending
large sums of money on validation studies of tests whose value is
questionable, or expending similar amounts in efforts to develop new,
effective evaluative techniques. Similarly, companies may continue
to employ the techniques condemned by Griggs until they are faced
with complaints, or they may change their practices now to avoid the
expenses of validation and litigation. Such treatment would not rule
out the use of the EEOC Guidelines as an invaluable starting point
and reference for employers and courts. This approach simply con-
templates a better balanced adjudication of the requirement in Griggs
that a standard provide a "reasonable measure of job performance" -
balanced in that it would respond both to the purpose and goal of
Title VII and to the right of employers to use legitimate employment
criteria that might have discriminatory effects.
V. CONCLUSION
The complaint of employers who have instituted what they felt
were objective employment criteria within section 703(h) of Title
VII is that it is inequitable to punish them because those criteria
reflect certain inherent educational and societal biases. Until more
efficient tests are developed, the time and expense that must be expended
to comply with the law is a heavy burden. Employers claim a legiti-
mate business purpose in seeking the most qualified candidates available,
suggesting that those elements that decrease the ability of blacks to
test well may similarly affect their ability to perform on the job.
After Griggs, to satisfy section 703(h) an employer must show
that his standards measure traits that are so appropriately related to
97. See 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1131-32.
98. One obvious reason for this distinction is convenience. A small company
lacking the time or personnel to devote to recruiting cannot be required to do as
thorough a job as a larger firm. At the same time, it is not as crucial that it do so,
since it employs far fewer employees than do the larger companies.
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the jobs available that they are necessary for the successful operation
of his business. The Supreme Court has said that under Title VII
employers have a responsibility for the alleviation of social evils which
cannot be avoided on the grounds of mere business convenience. The
role of the courts now is to determine whether the adverse effect of
testing and other requirements on minorities is justified by some
business necessity. Such intervention by the courts, though apparently
in conflict with the traditional concept of the free enterprise system,
is a response to the congressionally-mandated effort to ensure equality
of employment opportunity for all races. This end could not be reached
without restricting the freedom that employers have had in the past
in their personnel decisions. It is a costly but necessary means of
ensuring the vitality of Title VII.
